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Wilderness is both a geophysical reality and a legally defined land
category. As a matter of geography, wilderness is any place that has so
far escaped human development.' Legally, wilderness consists of those
places designated by Congress for preservation from such development,
areas that we call "official wilderness areas." Other writers in this sym-
posium discuss many aspects of wilderness designation and manage-
ment. Our aims in this article are to cover some of this same territory by
placing official wilderness in several contexts-historical, legal, and
managerial. By doing so, we intend to demonstrate that a wider range of
geographic wilderness is compatible with official wilderness and that the
implementation of other federal land management statutes may provide a
basis for resolving several key outstanding wilderness management
questions.
In retrospect, the creation of official wilderness was nearly inevita-
ble. Wilderness designation was the logical culmination of several his-
torical, social, and legal trends. Although Congress began setting aside
federal public lands as national parks for both recreational and preserva-
tion purposes in 1872 with the establishment of Yellowstone National
Park,' by 1964 most citizens agreed that an even more protective cate-
gory was necessary for some federal lands. It is surprising that the Wil-
derness Act of 1964' was enacted so early in the new age of preservation
consciousness and that the process for designating new wilderness areas
has gone as far as it has in such a relatively short time. We assert that the
Wilderness Act was also the beginning of a new era in federal land and
natural resource policy that is not yet near its culmination. Perhaps be-
cause of the relatively recent vintage of official wilderness, the extent to
which wilderness classification actually precludes development is not yet
entirely clear.
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1. These places are becoming fewer and farther between. See, e.g., John Markoff, The Lost
Art of Getting Lost, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 18, 1994, § 4, at I (stating that due to cellular phones and
other modem communications devices, "the very idea of wilderness, once one of the themes said to
define the American spirit, is vanishing").
2. See Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 24,17 Stat. 32 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 21(1994)).
3. Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§
1131-1136 (1994)).
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I. WILDERNESS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. Background of the Wilderness Act
The passage of the Wilderness Act in 1964 was a true break-
through-an apparently radical idea whose embodiment took the form of
federal legislation. But, official wilderness did not become a reality
overnight. The United States still owned an enormous quantity of land in
the 1960s. Manifest Destiny had given us a nation spanning the conti-
nent plus Alaska. By cession of foreign sovereigns and by treaties with
Native American sovereigns, the federal government at one time or an-
other was the fee owner of over two billion acres.'
During the nineteenth century, the dominant federal policy was dis-
position; Congress provided free or cheap lands to veterans, homestead-
ers, ranchers, miners, states, and railroads so that economic development
of the country could proceed apace But, geographical reality helped
bring federal land disposition to a halt in the 1930s. Much of the land
owned by the federal government was unsuitable for economic develop-
ment and therefore not attractive to prospective private owners. For ex-
ample, beyond the 100th meridian, to the west slope of the Sierras, rain-
fall declines drastically, and conventional agriculture becomes difficult if
not impossible.7 Consequently, huge areas of the West and Alaska re-
mained unclaimed and unwanted well into the twentieth century. Federal
holdings were also growing in the East and Midwest as the government
bought out the failed hardscrabble farmers and created new national for-
ests and national grasslands!
Another factor that contributed to a reversal of the federal land dis-
position policy was the progressive era impulse to reserve lands for con-
servation and preservation purposes.9 Writers had extolled the virtues of
raw, undeveloped territory since the middle of the nineteenth century. 0
Beginning in 1872, Congress and the Executive acted on similar im-
4. See BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS
1964, at 29 [hereinafter BLM 1964 STATISTICS] (determining that, as of June 30, 1963, the federal
government owned approximately 770 million acres of land).
5. See PAUL W. GATES, PUB. LAND LAW REv. COMM'N, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW
DEVELOPMENT 86 (1968).
6. See 1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW § 2.02 (1990); GATES, supra note 5, at 285, 357,415.
7. See GATES, supra note 5, at 495.
8. The Weeks Act, ch. 186, 36 Stat. 961 (1911), authorized the federal government to pur-
chase forest lands in the watershed of navigable streams. The Act resulted in "an extension of the
national forests to the eastern United States." James L. Huffman, A History of Forest Policy in the
United States, 8 ENVTL. L. 239, 271 (1977). During the New Deal, the Roosevelt Administration
implemented a program of land acquisition to provide relief for the unemployed. See id. at 272.
9. See I COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 2.03[l].
10. See generally RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND chs. 5, 8 (3d ed.
1982) (discussing the opinions and writings of Thoreau and Muir),
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pulses by creating parks, monuments, and wildlife refuges for primarily
preservation purposes." Pioneering forest rangers succeeded in estab-
lishing de facto administrative wilderness areas as early as the 1920s.'2
Commentators, such as Bernard DeVoto in the 1940s, bemoaned the
over-development and lack of upkeep in the national parks and sought
higher, more protective management standards.'3 Conservationists in the
1950s, led by Howard Zahniser and The Wilderness Society, broke down
political barriers, gaining acceptance for this new concept." In short, an
undifferentiated combination of philosophy, aesthetics, moral beliefs,
spirituality, and even animism coalesced in the concept of wilderness.
Many people found virtue in "savage" nature and wanted to ensure that
America would always have lands in that pre-Columbian state.
By 1964, things stood this way: the federal government was the
owner in trust of hundreds of millions of acres," many if not most of
which were remote from civilization and relatively barren. The National
Park and Wildlife Refuge Systems together comprised less than fifty
million acres, and the National Forest System encompassed less than 200
million acres.'6 About 500 million acres of land remained unreserved,
unclaimed and under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM).'7
The original Wilderness Act designated only 9.1 million acres' out
of 800 million onshore acres of federal land as wilderness (and out of
total United States territory of 2.3 billion acres)."' Thus, the radical notion
of "nonuse" initially was applied to only a tiny fraction of federally owned
lands, a fact which no doubt eased the fears of wilderness opponents.
But why did Congress place any part of the federal domain essen-
tially off limits to all development? And why in 1964? Why did the fac-
tors discussed above coalesce in that year in the form of the Wilderness
Act? In a sense, the answer is that it was both the worst of times and the
best of times. This circumstance incited both sympathetic and far-sighted
legislators such as Hubert Humphrey and Henry Jackson to shepherd this
seminal legislation through Congress.
11. See I COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 2.03[2].
12. Scott W. Hardt, Federal Land Management in the Twenty-First Century: From Wise Use
to Wise Stewardship, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 345, 360 (1994).
13. See BERNARD DEVOTO, ACROSS THE WIDE MISSOURI at xii (1947); BERNARD DEVOTO,
THE EASY CHAIR 255, 338, 345 (1955).
14. See Michael McCloskey, What the Wilderness Act Accomplished in Protection of Roadless
Areas Within the National Park System, 10 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 455,461 (1995).
15. See BLM 1964 STATISTICS; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
16. Cf id at 18-19; PUB. LAND LAW COMM'N, ONETHIRD oFTHE NATON'S LAND 22 (1970).
17. See id.
18. See Kenneth D. Hubbard et al., The Wilderness Act's Impact on Mining Activities: Policy
Versus Practice, 76 DENY. U. L. REv. 591, 591 (1999).
19. See PUB. LAND LAW REV. COMM'N, supra note 16, at 22. This figure includes 53 million
acres owned by the United States in trust for Indian tribes.
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It was the worst of times because of the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy in November 1963. His successor, President Lyndon
Johnson, enjoyed an almost unprecedented honeymoon on domestic policy
issues after taking office." In an era of burgeoning progressivism, and with
Democrats controlling both Houses of Congress, President Johnson was
able to push through an agenda of reform legislation ranging from civil
rights to Medicare to pollution control to land policy.' Dissenting legis-
lators raised their voices, but they were either drowned out or bought off.
The opposition of Representative Aspinall, for example, to wilderness and
preservation generally, was deflected by including his pet project, a Public
Land Law Review Commission, in the legislative package.'
It was the best of times because the nation was prosperous. The
economy boomed, leaving Americans with the means and the inclination
to enjoy themselves: the music was good, the cars were big, gas was
plentiful, leisure time expanded as did the mobility to use it, and the
great outdoors beckoned. Recreational use of federal lands was expand-
ing almost exponentially. Solitude, and even danger, became virtues in
the public mind. At the same time, the threats posed by resource develop-
ment to public health and welfare were becoming more evident in the
smoggy skies and oily rivers. Rachel Carson published Silent Spring' in
1962. The federal government's unsuccessful 1963 proposal to dam the
Colorado River and flood portions of the Grand Canyon provoked out-
rage among conservationists such as David Brower?' What came to be
known as the environmental movement was in its infancy, but even then
its ideas held great popular appeal. The people wanted wilderness, and
their elected representatives acceded to their desires.
20. See Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism-An American Tradi-
tion: Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 227, 269-70 (1996).
21. See id.
22. See Daniel Rohlf & Douglas L. Honnold, Managing the Balances of Nature: The Legal
Framework of Wilderness Management, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 251 n.14 (1988).
23. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). Professor Grad described the book's im-
pact this way:
The book energized conservationists and environmentalists. Its full contribution to the
environmental movement is difficult to measure. In dramatically reporting on the wide-
spread destruction of living things caused by DDT and other pesticides, Carson called
attention to the price we pay for the use of substances heretofore considered benign and
useful in the growing and protection of crops. The impact on plants and birds, and on
animal life, became even more frightening when it became clear that man, too, could be
hurt by pesticides, and that man was endangered because, standing at the very end of the
food chain, man's intake was likely to be greater as a result of bioconcentration.
FRANK P. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1-2 (3d ed. 1985); see also Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the
Beginning, A Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A Theory and Short History of Environmental Law,
27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 981, 981 n.1 (1994) ("Rachel Carson's Silent Spring was arguably the most
important single trigger of the environmental great awakening, the scientific treatise that brought
ecological consciousness into the American mainstream.").
24. See Phillip M. Bender, Restoring the Elwha, White Salmon, and Rogue Rivers: A Com-




B. The Age of Preservation
The Wilderness Act marked the true onset of what has been called
the Age of Preservation in America. ' For the first time, Congress acted
to preserve lands in a pristine state for their own sake, not as "pleasuring
grounds" or bird breeding areas. The congressional choice was almost
independent of human economic demands, much like the rationale for
the Endangered Species Act' would be a decade later. The Wilderness
Act of 1964 opened the floodgates to an unprecedented spate of envi-
ronmental and preservationist legislation and cognate developments.
Although the Act contained several compromises that allowed continuing
resource exploitation," it became, as implemented, the most far-reaching
land preservation statute ever enacted.
In the ensuing years, Congress responded to the emerging public
preservationist sentiment by legislating for stringent pollution control,
more balanced energy development, wildlife protection, and stricter pub-
lic land management standards. President Johnson presided over enact-
ment of the first major federal pollution laws;" their primitiveness and
unenforceability" led to the far more stringent amendments in the 1970s.
Congress also responded to presidential requests in the public land law
arena by enacting legislation for national rivers,3' the wild and scenic
river system,32 national trails,33 and the land and water conservation
fund. '
The biggest explosion of federal environmental legislation the
country has experienced, before or since, occurred during the Nixon
Administration. Addressing pollution, Congress passed the Clean Air
25. See I COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 2.04[1].
26. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994)).
27. See John Copeland Nagle, Playing Noah, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1259-60 (1998).
28. See 2 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 14B.04[1].
29. See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (codi-
fied at 33 U.S.C. § 466, transferred to 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1160, and omitted by Pub. L. No. 92-500,
§ 2, 86 Stat. 816 (1972)); Clean Air Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat.
485 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
30. See, e.g., Frank J. Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation, 68 MICH.
L. REV. 1103, 1117-18(1970).
31. Ozark National Scenic Riverways, Mo., Establishment, Pub. L. No. 88-492, 78 StaL 608
(1964) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 460m to 460m-7 (1994)).
32. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§
1271-1287 (1968) (1994)).
33. National Trails System Act, Pub. L. No. 90-543, 82 Stat. 919 (1968) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1241-1251 (1994)).
34. Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 88-578, 78 Stat. 897 (codi-
fied as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4 to -11 (1994 & Supp. 111996)).
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Amendments of 1970," the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972,' the Noise Control Act of 1972,"7 and the Marine
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972,' among others." In
1970, President Nixon created the Environmental Protection Agency.'
Addressing wildlife preservation, Congress enacted the Wild Free-
Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971,' the Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Act of 1972,2 the Endangered Species Act of 1973,.' and the Sykes
Act Extension of 1974.' Federal land use planning was initiated by the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969" and the Forest and Range-
land Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974.'
The Ford and Carter years saw Congress solidify and expand this
base of conservation/preservation legislation with amendments to the
pollution and wildlife laws. The former category included the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 7 and the Superfund statute, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980.48 The latter included the National Forest Management Act of
1976, ' the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, the Fed-
eral Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975,"' the Fisheries Conservation
and Management Act of 1976,2 the Surface Mining Control and Recla-
35. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
36. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.,
15 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 33 U.S.C.).
37. Pub. L No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1994
& Supp. 1 1996)).
38. Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.,
33 U.S.C.).
39. "Environmental" legislation was not limited to the outdoor environment. See, e.g., The
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 8 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C.).
40. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970,35 Fed. Reg. 15,623.
41. Pub. L. No. 92-195, 85 Stat. 649 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994 & Supp. H1
1996)).
42. Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
43. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 16
U.S.C.).
44. Pub. L. No. 93-452, 88 Stat. 452 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 670a-670f (1994)).
45. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
46. Pub. L. No. 93-378, 88 Stat. 476 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994
& Supp. UI 1996)).
47. Pub. L. No. 94-580,90 Star. 2795 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
48. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Star. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.,
33 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C.).
49. Pub. L. No. 94-588,90 Stat. 2949 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
50. Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.,
16 U.S.C., 30 U.S.C., 40 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C.).
51. Pub. L. No. 94-377,90 Stat. 1083 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
52. Pub. L. No. 95-354, 92 Stat. 519 (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
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mation Act of 1977,'3 the Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978,s'
and the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980.5
Since the advent of the Reagan Administration in 1981, little reform
legislation has made it through Congress, either to extend or undo the
framework erected in the 1970s. Congress amended several laws, but its
main original contributions in the past two decades were only the Federal
Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987,' the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990,"' and the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement
Act of 1997.'
The act of conferring official status on geophysical wilderness in
1964 was radical; it isn't any longer. The Wilderness Act of 1964 was
the first and perhaps most significant development in the triumph of the
preservation ethic in the United States. The historical significance of
American wilderness creation extends beyond the nation's physical bor-
ders." National park creation, often called the best idea America ever
had,' has been emulated in nearly every country in the world, and wil-
derness preservation is now following the same track.
II. WILDERNESS IN LEGAL CONTEXT
A. The Definition of Official Wilderness
Land in the United States can be, and has been, classified in a great
many ways. The two and a third billion acres that comprise the terrestrial
United States, plus territories and offshore areas under American juris-
diction, are owned by millions of entities, subject to hundreds of sover-
eigns, and put to innumerable uses. The federal government--due more
to historical accident than any conscious design-still owns in fee about
twenty-nine percent of onshore America.6' From those 660 million acres
in federal ownership (not counting severed estates or offshore lands),
Congress by 1998 had designated roughly 100 million acres as official
53. Pub. L. No. 95-87,91 Stat. 445 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
54. Pub. L. No. 95-514,92 Stat. 1803 (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C.).
55. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.,
43 U.S.C., 48 U.S.C.).
56. Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-256 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30
U.S.C.).
57. Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994)).
58, Pub. L. No. 105-57, 111 Stat. 1252.
59. See George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Concessions Law and Policy in the
National Park System, 74 DENY. U. L. REV. 729, 730-31 (1997).
60. See, e.g., Robert L. Fischman, The Problem of Statutory Detail in National Park Estab-
lishment Legislation and Its Relationship to Pollution Control Law, 74 DENY. U. L. REV. 779, 779
(1997) (quoting Wallace Stegner).
61. See Edward J. Heisel, Comment, Biodiversity and Federal Land Ownership: Mapping a
Strategy for the Future, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 229, 236 (1998).
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wilderness.' More than half of that is in Alaska.63 States, which also own
large quantities of land, have not established their own wilderness desig-
nation and management programs.'
Official wilderness occupies a unique niche among the many cate-
gories of federally owned lands. The Wilderness Act defines official
wilderness as follows:
A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own
works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area where
the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where
man himself is a visitor who does not remain. An area of wilderness
is further defined to mean in this chapter an area of undeveloped Fed-
eral land retaining its primeval character and influence, without per-
manent improvements or human habitation, which is protected and
managed so as to preserve its natural conditions and which (1) gener-
ally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature,
with the imprint of man's work substantially unnoticeable; (2) has
outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined
type of recreation; (3) has at least five thousand acres of land or is of
sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in an
unimpaired condition; and (4) may also contain ecological, geologi-
cal, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical
value.65
The definition obviously includes both objective components (to be
entitled to the protections afforded official wilderness, a tract must be
roadless and at least five thousand acres (two thousand hectares) in size),
and subjective components (it must have "outstanding opportunities for
solitude" or "primitive" recreation). ' David Brower has offered a simpler
definition: wilderness is an area "where the hand of man has not set
foot."'
Congress designated certain specific areas as wilderness in the 1964
Act itself." It also established processes, both in the 1964 Acte and sub-
sequently,"0 by which additional, suitable areas would be identified for
62. See GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND REsouRcEs LAW
141 (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND].
63. See id.
64. A notable exception is New York, whose constitution mandates that the Adirondack forest
preserves shall remain forever wild. See N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1.
65. Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994).
66. For further description of the objective and subjective components, see 2 CoGGINS &
GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 14B.02[l][a][i]-[ii].
67. David Brower, Foreword to VoICEs FOR THE WILDERNEss at vii, xi (William Schwartz
ed., 1969). See generally Gregory H. Aplet, On the Nature of Wildness: Exploring What Wilderness
Really Protects, 76 DENV. U. L. REv. 347 (1999) (contemplating other approaches to the definition
of wilderness).
68. See 2 CoGGiNs & GLicKsMAN, supra note 6, § 14B.02[1].
69. See Wilderness Act § 3, 16 U.S.C. § 1132.
70. See 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1994).
[Vol. 76:2
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ultimate congressional designation. These mechanisms have 'resulted in
the addition of millions more acres to the wilderness preservation sys-
tem, despite the obvious reluctance on the part of some federal land
management agencies to implement the study processes fully.7 In large
part, this broadening of the category of official wilderness is attributable
to expansive judicial interpretation of the obligations imposed on the
agencies by key provisions of the designation process.
The 1964 Wilderness Act commanded a very limited study process
by which the land management agencies (especially the Forest Service)
would report to the President, who in turn would recommend inclusion or
exclusion to Congress.' The Act commanded that the Secretary of the
Interior review all roadless areas of five thousand contiguous acres or
more in the national parks and monuments and all roadless areas within
the national wildlife refuges and report on their suitability for preserva-
tion as wilderness." According to the statute, the Forest Service was to
review only areas classified by it as "primitive" in 1964.' In 1971, the
Tenth Circuit in Parker v. United Statesi expanded that study mandate to
contiguous areas and decreed that the agency could not allow wilderness-
destroying activities until the President and Congress had an opportunity
to exercise their discretion. ' Other courts concurred in the context of
NEPA evaluation.'
The Forest Service responded to the judicial desire to safeguard
wilderness possibilities by embarking on two successive system-wide
wilderness suitability studies called RARE I and RARE U." In 1982, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed an injunction against the "release" of wilderness-
eligible tracts back into multiple use, sustained yield management.'9 The
consequent freeze on road building and logging in thirty-six million acres
71. See Hardt, supra note 12, at 380-81.
72. See Wilderness Act § 3(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(c); see also Marla E. Mansfield, A Primer of
Public Land Law, 68 WASH. L. REV. 801, 848-49 (1993) (discussing the process by which federal
lands become wilderness areas).
73. See Wilderness Act § 3(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(c).
74. See Wilderness Act § 3(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b).
75. 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971).
76. Parker, 448 F.2d at 796-97.
77. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. United States Forest Serv., 46 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that Congress did not intend to preclude judicial review of Forest Service compliance
with NEPA); Smith v. United States Forest Serv., 33 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1994) (requiring the Forest
Service to consider environmental impact on an area of proposed timber sale even though the area
included inventoried land); Wyoming Outdoor Coord. Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir.
1973) (ruling that a Forest Service determination that environmental impact statement procedures
did not apply must be evaluated under a reasonableness standard in light of the requirements and
high standards in NEPA); Sierra Club v. Butz, 3 Envtl. L. Rep. 20071 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (enjoining
any action that would change the wilderness character of any roadless or undeveloped area listed in
Forest Service inventories until the filing of a NEPA environmental impact statement).
78. See generally Michael McCloskey & Jeffrey Desautels, A Primer on Wilderness Law and
Policy, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10278 (1983) (discussing development of the wilderness system and the
National Forest System's roadless area reviews and evaluations).
79. See California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 769 (9th Cir. 1982).
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of national forests prompted Congress to enact a series of statewide wil-
derness bills in the early 1980s.' The equivalent process for BLM public
lands has lagged far behind," despite judicial reversals of agency efforts
to delete all split-estate lands from its inventory of tracts with wilderness
characteristics."'
B. Modernizing Official Wilderness Designation
At present, one hundred million or so acres of land comprise the
National Wilderness Preservation System." That is about twice the size
of Kansas, or more than one quarter the size of Alaska. ' Is it too much?
Wilderness opponents typically argue that wilderness designation should
be minimized because it "locks up" valuable resources, the development
of which will assist in our material prosperity." From this perspective, far
too much land in total has been put off limits to resource exploitation and
reserved for unproductive "nonuse." Wilderness proponents typically
chafe at both the nonuse and unproductivity characterizations, claiming
that natural resources in wilderness areas are being preserved for future
generations.' In any event, they claim, wilderness preservation is afford-
able in this affluent society and should be expanded for noneconomic
reas~nsY There is obviously no single correct legal "answer" to the
question of how much is enough (or too much) land to protect. To this
question, there are only political answers. The most critical political fact
is this: in three and one half decades since the initial adoption of the Wil-
derness Act, legislation has added lands to the system on a more-or-less
annual basis, but not one tract has ever been "de-designated," i.e., re-
moved from wilderness status.88
Our response to the question takes a more process-oriented tack.
Despite the addition of millions of acres to the wilderness preservation
system as a result of the study and designation procedures mandated by
Congress, the process as originally conceived and subsequently imple-
mented has not been sufficiently systematic to promote fully the statutory
goal of "secur[ing] for the American people of present and future gen-
erations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness." 9 We con-
80. See, e.g., Oregon Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-328, 98 Stat. 272 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.); Washington State Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-339, 98 Stat. 299 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.); see also FEDERAL
PUBLIC LAND, supra note 62, at 1053.
81. See 2 C6GGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 14B.02[4].
82. See Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 335-38 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
83. See FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND, supra note 62, at 141.
84. See THE STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK 1566, 1605 (Barry Turner ed., 1998).
85. Rohlf & Honnold, supra note 22, at 257-58.
86. See id. at 273, 279.
87. See id.
88. Cf. FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND, supra note 62, at 1031-32.
89. Wilderness Act § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1994).
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tend that the administration of the process by which lands are considered
for inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation System should be
consolidated so that opportunities for present and future generations to
benefit from wilderness amenities are not inadvertently lost.
The current wilderness system is a product of planning-sort of.
Each of the four major federal land management agencies conducted
surveys to determine which tracts of land qualified for designation ac-
cording to the semi-objective criteria for wilderness.' Those surveys and
recommendations were then forwarded to the President and the Congress
for definitive action.91 But, so far as we can tell, little thought has been
devoted to the National Wilderness Preservation System as a system, in
the same way, for example, as the National Park System is designed to
function as an integrated whole. Certainly, the management of official
wilderness areas by four separate agencies-each with its own traditions,
missions, and governing standards-has no pretense of uniformity or
even of coordination.
While the management priorities of the Wilderness Act are fairly
clear, 2 the agencies just as clearly differ in their receptivity to wilderness
designation and management. Both the Forest Service and the BLM, for
example, have at times evinced hostility toward wilderness designation?
As a result, no one can be sure that Congress has had the opportunity to
consider all lands meeting the minimum statutory criteria, judicial review
of the designation process notwithstanding. Further, the final decision on
each tract-often made on a state-by-state basis-is necessarily a prod-
uct of political considerations with a local or statewide rather than a na-
tional focus. In a striking sense, wilderness is what is left over. Not only
did no one choose to homestead or mine the tract that may now be ripe
for wilderness designation when it was available for exploitation, no
decision makers thought it was worthy of multiple use resource devel-
opment of any intensity after it was withdrawn from homesteading.
To remedy the scattershot nature of the designation process, we
suggest consideration of a general overhaul of the jurisdictional bounda-
ries of federal lands." The existence of four separate major (and several
lesser) agencies to manage these lands is neither constitutionally required
nor historically foreordained. Modern,justification for retaining four
separate land management agencies to govern a multiplicity of federal
lands categories is difficult to discern; the rationale for dividing up the
90. See CRAIG W. ALLIN, THE POLMCS OF WILDERNESS PRESERVATION 148 (1982),
91. See id.
92. Cf infra Part L1.A.
93. See Hardt, supra note 12, at 378-80.
94. The reorganization we propose here has implications that extend well beyond improve-
ments in the wilderness designation and management processes. This article is not the place to
explore those extrawilderness implications, although we are confident that the proposed reorganiza-
tion would benefit other aspects of federal land management as well.
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task of managing official wilderness among these same four entities is
entirely lacking. We recommend, therefore, that serious thought be de-
voted to consolidation and simplification.
At the risk of oversimplification, one can view federal lands as the
source of two kinds of "goods"--commodities and personal pleasure.
One obvious course of reform, then, is to condense the four existing
agencies into two: the National Park and Wildlife Service (NPWS),
which would take charge of the lands devoted primarily to noncommod-
ity uses, and the National Forest and Range Service (NFRS), which
would control the lands set aside principally for resource extraction. The
new NPWS would assume jurisdiction over all current units of the na-
tional park and national wildlife refuge systems plus all adjacent or
(more-or-less) freestanding wilderness areas. In the process, Congress
should consolidate the new federal land management systems by adding
to the NPWS any NFRS lands necessary for contiguity and buffer zones,
preservation of wildlife corridors, and ecosystem management. The new
NFRS would then be responsible for the remaining lands, which would
remain open to extractive activities under the multiple use, sustained
yield laws.95
This streamlining concept is relatively simple and aligns well with a
wide variety of proposals for wider and broader management priorities.
The process of redrawing the boundaries would be far from simple, how-
ever, and undoubtedly would be highly acrimonious. The division be-
tween lands suitable for resource extraction and those amenable to rec-
reational use, for example, is anything but a clean one. On the one hand,
even on national forest and BLM lands, where commodity production
(minerals, timber, red meat, etc.) has long been the dominant goal, re-
source exploitation is giving way to recreational and preservation use.'
On the other hand, the growth of commercial outfits that provide recrea-
tional outings to the federal lands for ever-increasing numbers of tourists
has tended to blur the distinction between commodity and personal
pleasure use.' But the end is worth the fight. Present land categories and
land management agencies are not etched in stone: as Congress did, so
can it undo. Consolidation, as here advocated, would produce a more
efficient administration of federal land policy and far better protection
for American wilderness. The new NPWS would still have to reconcile
potential conflicts between recreational and preservation use of the lands
95. Multiple use, sustained yield management in practice is a fundamentally bad idea, but that
story is for another time and place. Cf. 3 COGGINS & GLuCKSMAN, supra note 6, ch. 16.
96. See Raymond Rasker, A New Look at Old Vistas: The Economic Role of Environmental
Quality in Western Public Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 369, 390-91 (1994).
97. See generally Coggins & Glicksman, supra note 59 (discussing current law governing
National Park Service concessions as well as proposals for reform).
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placed in its stewardship." With the exception of wilderness lands sub-
ject to preexisting developmental uses, the agency would not have to
resolve conflicts between preservation and development on lands poten-
tially suitable for wilderness designation or lands within its jurisdiction
adjacent to official wilderness.
C. The Scattershot Nature of Official Wilderness Designations
The current legal definition of official wilderness" is not the only
possible definition. In fact, Congress on more than one occasion jetti-
soned "purity" notions when it wanted to include areas with marginal
qualifications under the Wilderness Act's definition. An example is the
Endangered American Wilderness Act of 197 8 ."00 Congress in that Act
designated as wilderness a number of areas that arguably did not qualify
as such according to the technical legal definition."l ' We contend that the
evolution of preservation law in the United States, since the adoption of
the Wilderness Act in 1964, makes it appropriate, if not imperative, to
consider expansion of the legal definition of wilderness. In particular,
official wilderness should be expanded to include natural landforms and
ecosystems not currently represented in the wilderness system, recreated
wilderness areas, lands not currently in federal ownership, and offshore
lands.
Several post-1964 large-scale federal lands developments," and the
even larger proposals for change now pending,'" provide a template for
sweeping ecosystems not now included within the confines of official
wilderness. The National Park System now resembles a true national
system because the NPS is committed to having all representative biomes
of the country included in its holdings." New federal, state, and private
arrangements for more integrated and preservation land management
98. Conflicts between recreational and preservational use of the federal lands, including lands
designated as official wilderness, have joined conflicts between recreational use and commodity
development as frequent subjects of litigation in recent years. See 3 COGGINS & GtLCKSMAN, supra
note 6, §§ 17.01, 17.03(1].
99. See Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994).
100. Pub. L. No. 95-237,92 Stat. 40 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
101. See FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND, supra note 62, at 1039. But see Endangered American Wil-
derness Act of 1978 § l(a)(2) ("[C]ertain of these undeveloped national forest lands meet all statu-
tory criteria for suitability as wilderness as established by subsection 2(c) of the Wilderness Act.").
102. See Heisel, supra note 61, at 265.
103. See id. at 277.
104. Professor Fischman maintains that "[a]s the biological diversity of the United States con-
tinues to erode ... the national park system becomes ever more valuable to maintain the biological
integrity of representative ecosystems throughout the country." Fisehman, supra note 60, at 782.
Park System lands do not currently reflect that diversity. See Heisel, supra note 61, at 232 n.10; cf
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 48-49 (1997) ("Although
they fall short of fully representing all of the nation's ecosystem types, the lands the federal govern-
ment currently holds present enormous conservation opportunities and are the logical starting point
for a national biodiversity conservation strategy.").
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have been created for areas such as the New Jersey Pine Barrens,"° the
Lake Tahoe Basin,"'6 the Columbia Gorge,"D and the California Desert
Conservation Area,"' among others. Habitat conservation plans under the
ESA are expanding rapidly in size and scope." Planning for entire water-
sheds is in vogue."' Protection and allocation of salmon runs involves
multiple jurisdictions, dozens of entities, and thousands of people."'
Many pending land use and classification proposals necessarily im-
plicate wilderness considerations. The Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem
concept posits the notion that an area much larger than the Park itself
should be brought under coordinated management to minimize conflicts
and degradation. " ' Even more ambitious is the proposal for a Northern
Rockies Supercorridor for wildlife habitat and movement stretching from
Yellowstone hundreds of miles north to Lake Louise in Canada."' The
Poppers' vision of a Buffalo Commons on the Northern Great Plains,"'
although seldom taken seriously, has considerable intrinsic merit.
105. SeeJOHNA. MCPHEE, THE PINEBARRENs 15 (1968).
106. See Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233 (1969).
107. See Bowen Blair, Jr., The Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area: The Act, Its Gene-
sis and Legislative History, 17 ENVTL. L. 863, 866-68 (1987).
108. California Desert Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat 4471 (codified at
16 U.S.C. § 410aaa note (1994)).
109. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the
U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 351-58 (1993); Lindell L.
Marsh, Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: A New Paradigm for Conserving
Biological Diversity, 8 TUL. ENvTL. L.J. 97, 98-99 (1994).
110. Cf Constance E. Hunt, Wetland Planning Processes in a Watershed Context, SA83 ALI-
ABA COURSE OF STUDY 207, 209 (1996).
111. See generally Michael C. Blumm, The Amphibious Salmon: The Evolution of Ecosystem
Management in the Columbia River Basin, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 653 (1997) (discussing water man-
agement plans aimed at saving salmon); Michael C. Blumm & Andy Simrin, The Unraveling of the
Parity Promise: Hydropower, Salmon, and Endangered Species in the Columbia Basin, 21 ENVTL.
L. 657, 659-62 (1991) (discussing the failure of the Northwest Power Act).
112. See Robert B. Keiter, An Introduction to the Ecosystem Management Debate, in THE
GREATER YELLOWSTONE EcosysTEM: REDEFINING AMERICA'S WILDERNESS HERITAGE 3, 4-6
(Robert B. Keiter & Mark S. Boyce eds., 1991); John.Mumma & Paul Grigsby, A Vision for Yellow-
stone's Forests, 15 PuB. LAND L. REV. 11, 49-52 (1994); see also T.W. Clark & D. Zaunbrecher,
The Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem: The Ecosystem Concept in Natural Resource Policy and Man-
agement, 5 RENEWABLE RESOURCES J., Summer 1987, at 8 (discussing the evolution of the greater
Yellowstone ecosystem and policy considerations).
113. See Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act of 1992, H.R. 5944, 102d Cong. § 4;
Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U.
COLO. L. REv. 293, 327 (1994); see also Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act of 1993, H.R.
2638, 103d Cong. (proposing designation of wildlife areas in Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington,
and Wyoming ).
114. See Frank J. Popper & Deborah Epstein Popper, The Great Plains: From Dust to Dust,
PLANNING, Dec. 1987, at 12, 17-18; see also ANNE MATTHEWS, WHERE THE BUFFALO ROAM 13-
14 (1992) (discussing the Poppers' vision of a buffalo common); Winona LaDuke, Traditional Eco-
logical Knowledge and Environmental Futures, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 127, 144-45
(1994) (discussing Ward Churchill's expansion of the Poppers' idea of a buffalo common).
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As the idea of broader inclusion seems not so far-fetched, so too the
idea of wilderness creation or re-creation should not be dismissed out of
hand. While no human agency can reclaim an area as well as Mother
Nature, still, humans can undo much of what humans have done-and in
fact are doing so on several fronts. '
Consider wildlife species reintroduction. The recent reintroduction
of wolves into Yellowstone, Montana, and Idaho wilderness areas gener-
ated a great deal of controversy."' In reality, however, a number of other
reintroduction programs have been quite successful and relatively un-
controversial."" Wild turkeys and otters in Missouri, pronghorn antelope
in Kansas, condors in the Southwest, and elk in Wisconsin are just a few
of the instances in which humans are recreating aspects of nature that
humans had earlier eradicated." s
Or consider dams and roads. Whether the United States has built too
many is of course a political judgment, but the deleterious effects of both
on the natural world are incontestable. Neither dams nor roads are neces-
sarily permanent, however. Roads can be torn up and reclaimed. Dams
can be blown up so that rivers can reacquire their natural free-flowing
characteristics. The notion of reclaiming nature or recreating wilderness
is not a pipe dream. If development turns out to be mistaken, corrective
measures sometimes can and should be taken. The Forest Service-with
the longest road system in the world" 9 -will see many of its roaded areas
revert to roadlessness because it simply does not have the resources to
keep the forces of deterioration at bay.' And, dams are no longer sacro-
sanct. Since the Supreme Court ruled in the Snail Darter case"' that the
welfare of an obscure little fish took legal precedence over completion of
115. Cf. Dave Foreman, The Wildlands Project and the Rewilding of North America, 76 DENV.
U. L. REV. 535 (1999) (describing the concept of rewilding).
116. See United States v. McKittrick, 142 F.3d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 1998); Wyoming Farm
Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 987 F. Supp. 1349, 1355-56 (D. Wyo. 1997); see also Inga Haagenson
Causey, Comment, The Reintroduction of the Wolf in Yellowstone: Has the Program Fatally
Wounded the Very Species it Sought to Protect?, 11 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 468-73 (1998) (discuss-
ing reintroduction of the gray wolf and the litigation surrounding it).
117. See generally Holly Doremus, Private Property Interests, Wildlife Restoration, and Com-
peting Visions of a Western Eden, 18 J. LAND REsOuRcES & ENVrL. L. 41, 41-43 (1998) (discuss-
ing the reintroduction of nearly extinct species).
118. See id at 41; see also Christine Bertelson, Hi Hi Birdie Turkeys Make Comeback to Wild,
Not to Tables, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 25, 1991, at Al; Jerry Davis, Add Elk to View List;
Director of Elk Reintroduction Study Says Clam Lake Is Waking Up to Tourist Opportunities, Wis.
STATE J., Oct. 11, 1998, at 13D; Andrew Melnykovych, Indiana Is Hoping New Otters Will Thrive
at Patoka Restoration-An Example of National Effort, COURIER J., Jan. 29, 1997, at IA; Missouri
Conservation Dep't, Despite Second Trapping Season, River Otters Are Thriving, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Aug. 7, 1998, at 6.
119. See Nick Jans, Alaska Boondoggle Costs Taxpayers $102 Million, USA TODAY, Nov. 6,
1997, at 19A.
120. See Susan Drumheller, Road Closures Loom for CDA Forests; Forest Service Taking
Extensive Look at Heavily Roaded District, THE SPOKESMAN REV., Nov. 8, 1997, at Al.
121. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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a large, unnecessary dam," public opinion in general has swung away
from dam-building (now virtually a dead letter, like nuclear plants)"
toward protection of fish habitat and free (or freer) flowing rivers. An
Interior Secretary suggested studying whether to tear down Hetch-
Hetchy dam in Yosemite National Park.'" The Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission recently ordered the decommissioning of a dam in
Maine because the damage it caused to fish runs could not be eliminated
at a cost that would be justified by the revenues to be generated by con-
tinued operation of the dam." Even more radical is the idea, now being
actively pursued, of blowing up four dams on the Snake River system to
facilitate anadromous fish passage.'" The impetus, ironically enough, is
economic: it costs more to transport the fish around the dams than the
dams are worth.27
To date, all official wilderness areas have been carved out of lands
already owned by the federal government. That need not always be the
case. Many national recreational tracts have been created out of both
public and private lands, using purchase, condemnation, exchange, zon-
ing, and cooperative agreements as the means of acquisition and en-
forcement.'" Politics and money, not geography or law, are the only bar-
riers to doing the same thing for wilderness re-creation. One obvious
candidate is the high plains region of the Midwest. Vast regions of west-
ern Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and the Dakotas, along with eastern
Colorado and Wyoming, are becoming depopulated.'" The remaining
122. The fate of the dam was subsequently reversed by Congress. See George Cameron Cog-
gins & Robert L. Glicksman, Power, Procedure, and Policy in Public Lands and Resources Law, 10
NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T, Summer 1995, at 3, 81-82.
123. See Maryanne Lawrence Grodin & Alexandra B. Keith, Nuclear Whistleblowers: An
Environment of Change, 41 FED. BAR NEws & J. 98, 100 (1994). But cf Margaret Kriz, A Come-
back for Nukes?, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 24, 1998, at 2492 (describing the "comeback" being staged by
nuclear power).
124. See Hetch Hetchy Plan "Dead," L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 7, 1988, at 2. For discussion of the
unsuccessful battle by John Muir and others to prevent construction of the dam, see Peter Manus,
One Hundred Years of Green: A Legal Perspective on Three Twentieth Century Nature Philoso-
phers, 59 U. PrT. L. REV. 557, 611-16 (1998); Elmo R. Richardson, The Struggle for the Valley:
California's Hetch Hetchy Controversy, 1905-1913, 38 CAL. HIST. Soc'Y Q. 248, 250 (1959);
William Andrew Shutkin, Note, The National Park Service Act Revisited, 10 VA. ENVTE.. LJ. 345,
357-60 (1991).
125. See Edwards Mfg. Co., 81 F.E.R.C. 1 61,255, at 62,209-11 (1997); Carey Goldberg, Fish
Are Victorious Over Dam As U.S. Agency Orders Shutdown, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1997, at A6.
126. See New Plan for Rescuing the Salmon Breaching of Dams Would Let Endangered Fish
Swim to Sea, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 21, 1997, at B5. See generally Bender, supra note 24 (discussing the
proposed removal of several dams).
127. See Edwards Mfg. Co., 81 F.E.R.C. at 62,210.
128. See, e.g., 2 COoGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 15.04[l] (discussing use of condem-
nation and purchase to establish wild and scenic river corridors); I COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra
note 6, § 10B (discussing sources and scope of federal condemnation power).
129. See Jon Margolis, The Reopening of the Frontier, N.Y. TMES, Oct. 15, 1995, § 6, at 51.
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people survive by mining groundwater, which in time will be depleted.'"
The United States several times before has bailed out bankrupt, hard-
scrabble farmers by purchasing their marginal farms. Doing the same for
the establishment of a plains wilderness, thus, has precedent. Conversion
from farms to roadlessness would of course be expensive and difficult,
but certainly not impossible.
Similarly, the Mississippi River delta in Louisiana would be an ex-
cellent candidate for recreated wilderness. According to many accounts,
human activity has trashed it unmercifully with pollution, water diver-
sions, and related activities."' Coastal river deltas are among the most
prolific producers of life on the planet,' 2 and protecting that productive
capacity should be among our highest priorities. Nothing protects land
like designation as official wilderness.
Further, the concept of official wilderness to date has been limited
to onshore lands within the boundaries of this country.'33 It need not be so
circumscribed. For example, cross-boundary national park creation with
Canada has proven successful.'" In the same vein, the Canada/Alaska
border has many areas that could qualify for wilderness designation.'
Creating a wilderness complex stretching from Yellowstone to Lake
Louise and beyond is well within the realm of possibility."n Offshore
wilderness may be even more important to develop. All of the Florida
Keys are now within a national marine sanctuary. "7 To create a wilder-
ness from the north end of the Everglades National Park down to and
past the Keys would serve many worthwhile purposes, not the least being
protection of a prolific life producing region. A case can also be made for
declaring the entire Bering Sea an international wilderness.
Attempts to implement each of these ideas would create contro-
versy, provoke bitter resistance, and threaten disruption of the status quo
130. See Kurt Stephenson, Groundwater Management in Nebraska: Governing the Commons
Through Local Resource Districts, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 521 (1996).
131. See generally Oliver A. Houck, Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana: Causes, Consequences,
and Remedies, 58 TUL. L. REV. 3 (1983) (discussing the negative effects of canals, pipelines, and
pollution on the Mississippi River).
132. See id. at 84.
133. Cf. Wilderness Act § 2(a), (c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a), (c) (1994).
134. The international parks that have been established include Waterton-Glacier and Quetico-
Superior. See Dino Ross, International Management of the Flathead River Basin, 1 COLO. J. INT'L.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 223, 223-24 (1990).
135. See Miistakis Institute for the Rockies, The Yellowstone to Yukon Conservation Initiative:
To Restore and Protect the Wild Heart of North America (last modified Aug. 9, 1998)
<http://www.rockies.ca/y2y/>.
136. See id.
137. See Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary and Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-605, 104
Stat. 3089 (1990) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 102-587, §§ 2206, 2209, 106 Stat. 5039, 5053, 5054
(1992)).
138. St. Matthew Island within the Bering Sea was designated as an official wilderness area in
1970. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 606 F. Supp. 825, 828 (D. Ala. 1984) (citing 16 U.S.C.
§ 1431(a) (1982)).
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in a variety of ways. Resistance, however, is not a good reason for dis-
carding such possibilities out of hand; every change that we now recog-
nize as social progress also was the subject of bitter resistance at the time
of proposal.9 Some wilderness protection efforts may turn out to be in-
feasible or simply not worth the economic and social disruption they
would cause. Yet, others might prove to be beneficial from a variety of
perspectives.
Congress in 1964 apparently thought of wilderness as mountainous,
wooded, remote areas, owned by the government, in which few had ever
expressed an economic interest. That view was highly valuable at the
time, but many factors contribute to an argument for a more expansive
definition today-a definition to which there is no legal barrier. As the
richest nation ever on earth, the United States can afford to do the right
thing. Whether the designation of any particular area as official wilder-
ness is the right thing cannot, of course, be decided in the abstract. The
potential benefits of a broadened definition of official wilderness, how-
ever, can be appreciated in general terms." Wilderness ensures the avail-
ability of experiences with nature and the continuation of productive
capacity of the land for future generations of Americans.' An increase in
official wilderness will probably be an economic plus, given the enor-
mous rise in tourism and recreation. This factor, however, should not be
dispositive, because wilderness is not, at bottom, about money.
Im. WILDERNESS IN THE CONTEXT OF FEDERAL LAND USE
MANAGEMENT
Designation of a parcel as part of the National Wilderness Preserva-
tion System does not change its geophysical character. Indeed, designa-
tion is intended in large part to prevent changes in the physical character
of the land and the resources it contains. 2 Designation does, however,
drastically change a parcel's legal status in terms of its availability for
human use. Official wilderness is open to fewer uses than any other fed-
eral lands category."'3 The apparent simplicity of the management stan-
dard governing official wilderness, however, is misleading. Among the
issues likely to recur in future controversies involving wilderness man-
agement are those relating to the protection of existing private rights, the
scope of agency duties to provide affirmative protection to wilderness
139. Cf. Hubbard et al., supra note 18, at 592-97 (describing the strong opposition of mining
interests to the adoption of the Wilderness Act).
140. See, e.g., Pete Morton, The Economic Benefits of Wilderness: Theory and Practice, 76
DENV. U. L. REv. 465,475-91 (1999) (describing categories of the benefits of wilderness).
141. See Wilderness Act § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1994) (declaring a policy of securing for
present and future generations "the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness").
142. See id (Wilderness areas shall be administered "in such manner as will leave them unim-
paired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness.").




characteristics, and the authority of agencies with jurisdiction over wil-
derness to protect it against external threats.
A. The Impact of Grandfathering Existing Private Rights and Related
Uses
Primitive recreation is the only allowable human use of official wil-
derness, barring special statutory exception or preexisting vested use
rights. As a general rule, no commercial enterprises or permanent roads
are allowed in official wilderness.'" Except to the extent necessary to
administer wilderness areas, temporary roads, motor vehicle use, and the
establishment of structures or installations are also barred. " Commercial
services may be performed only to the extent necessary to realize the
recreational or other wilderness purposes of designated areas."
The range of permissible uses is considerably broader than those
authorized by the general rule, however. The general prohibition on
commercial uses and permanent roads is "subject to existing private
rights."' 7 The scope of that exception is far from clear, as the Sixth Cir-
cuit's recent nondefinitive decision concerning the propriety of Forest
Service restrictions on preexisting littoral rights illustrates." The 1964
Act also creates a series of more specific exceptions. Aircraft and motor-
boat uses already established at the time of designation may continue,
subject to reasonable agency regulation.' 9 Activities, such as prospecting
for the purpose of gathering information about mineral resources, are
permitted in national forest wilderness areas, provided they are con-
ducted in a manner compatible with wilderness preservation.' ° New min-
eral location and leasing in wilderness areas has been prohibited since
January 1, 1984," but pre-1984 claims and leases may continue to be
exploited, subject to "reasonable stipulations" adopted by the Secretary
of Agriculture to protect wilderness character."' Similarly, livestock
grazing within national forest wilderness areas that predated designation
may continue, subject to "reasonable regulations.""
144. See Wilderness Act § 4(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c).
145. See id.
146. See Wilderness Act § 4(d)(5), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5). This authorization does not encom-
pass commercial fishing in wilderness areas of the national parks. See Alaska Wildlife Alliance v.
Jensen, 108 F.3d 1065, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 1997).
147. WildernessAct§4(c), 16U.S.C. § 1133(c).
148. Cf Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996), aff'g on rehearing en
banc by an equally divided court 843 F. Supp. 327 (W.D. Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 764
(1997). For further discussion of Stupak-Thrall see infra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
149. See Wilderness Act § 4(d)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 133(d)(1).
150. See Wilderness Act § 4(d)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(2).
151. See 2 CoGGINs & GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 14B.04[6].
152. Wilderness Act § 4(d)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3).
153. Wilderness Act § 4(d)(4), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4).
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The statutory exceptions for "existing private rights" may be neces-
sary to avoid raising takings questions under the Fifth Amendment,"
although private property rights in public lands are often limited.' The
fuzziness of the concept, together with the inherent ambiguity of the
scope of "reasonable" regulation to which grandfathered uses are subject,
leaves open the possibility that activities which create substantial risks to
wilderness character may proceed. Courts tend to defer to the exercise of
agency expertise in many federal lands contexts." A little extra judicial
vigilance might be appropriate in circumstances in which excepted uses
appear to threaten wilderness values."7
An even greater threat to these values may lie in the exceptions to the
restricted uses of official wilderness that appear in individual wilderness
designation legislation. In a rider to the Transportation Equity Act for the
21st Century,"" adopted in 1998, Congress authorized motorized portages
in portions of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness.'9 The ex-
ample is noteworthy not necessarily because of its likely impact but be-
cause of its manner of adoption. In the 1990s Congress has increasingly
resorted to appropriations riders in lieu of substantive authorizing legis-
lation to effectuate national environmental (or antienvironmental) pol-
icy.'" If Congress continues to do so, it will create a significant risk that
activities with the potential to damage wilderness character permanently
may be authorized by stealth rather than through the crucible of informed
public debate. This threat is not an idle one. For example, during the
105th Congress efforts were made to attach to appropriations legislation
a rider that would authorize, for the first time, the construction of a new
road in an official wilderness area.' In the long run, such piecemeal ex-
ceptions may not only transform the geophysical character of the affected
wilderness areas, they also may wind up seriously diluting the legal con-
cept of official wilderness itself.
154. U.S. CONST. amend V ("[Nlor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."); cf. Store Safe Redlands Assoc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 726 (1996); Hage v.
United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147 (1996).
155. See, e.g., Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
156. Cf., e.g., 3 CoGoiNS & GLICSMAN, supra note 6, § 16.01[3] (addressing the implementa-
tion of multiple use management statutes).
157. Cf. Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Robertson, 978 F.2d 1484 (8th Cir.
1992) (determining that the law needs to be strictly construed to fulfill the intent of the Wilderness
Act).
158. Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107 (1998) (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C.A. § 101
(1998)).
159. See Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century § 1212(v), 23 U.S.C.A. § 101.
160. See Robert L. Glicksman & Stephen B. Chapman, Regulatory Reform and (Breach of) the
Contract with America: Improving Environmental Policy or Destroying Environmental Protection?,
5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9,21-22 (1996).
161. See Margaret Kriz, Rough Riders, NAT'L J., Sept. 5, 1998, at 2022, 2024-25 (describing




B. The Affirmative Preservation Duty
An important management question which has received relatively
little attention to date is the extent to which land management agencies
with jurisdiction over official wilderness have an affirmative duty to
protect the values reflected in that designation. The Wilderness Act de-
crees in section 4(b) that each agency with jurisdiction over official wil-
derness area "be responsible for preserving the wilderness character of
the area and shall so administer such area for such other purposes for
which it may have been established as also to preserve its wilderness
character."' 2
The question of whether and to what extent the managing agency is
under an affirmative preservation duty was raised in 1987 litigation over
beetle infestations, 3 but the judicial answer was not entirely clear. The
Forest Service embarked on an "extensive tree-cutting and chemical-
spraying campaign" to control pine beetle infestations in southern Na-
tional Forest wilderness areas.'" Plaintiffs claimed that the beetle pro-
gram violated the Wilderness Act as well as several other statutes.'" The
Act authorizes the Secretary to take "such measures ... in the control
of... insects.., subject to such conditions as the Secretary deems desir-
able."" Plaintiffs argued that the control program was not necessary be-
cause it would be demonstrably ineffective.'
The district court distinguished between measures meant to protect
wilderness resources and measures taken within wilderness areas to pro-
tect economic interests and resources on adjacent private lands." As to
the former, the agency enjoys great latitude; courts should upset such de-
cisions only upon "the most explicit showing of arbitrary irresponsibil-
ity."' But a program involving harm to wilderness resources for the
benefit of private landowners, said the court, is altogether another story."'
[T]his case does not involve the management of Wilderness Areas as
such. Rather, it presents a different question, one that is not fully ad-
dressed by the Act itself. That question is whether the Secretary has
been given the same .. .broad management discretion previously
noted when he takes actions within the Wilderness Areas for the
benefit of outside commercial and other private interests. This ques-
tion must be answered in the negative because in a situation like this
the Secretary is not managing the wilderness but acting contrary to
wilderness policy for the benefit of outsiders.
162. Wilderness Act § 4(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (1994).
163. See Sierra Club v. Lyng, 662 F. Supp. 40,41-42 (DD.C. 1987).
164. Lyng, 662 F. Supp. at 41.
165. See id.
166. Wilderness Act § 4(d)(l), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(1).
167. See Lyng, 662 F. Supp. at 41.
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A fair reading of the Wilderness Act places a burden on the Sec-
retary affirmatively to justify his actions under these circumstances.
Where such actions are shown to contravene wilderness values guar-
anteed by the Wilderness Act, as they do here, then the Secretary
must, when challenged, justify them by demonstrating they are neces-
sary to effectively control the threatened outside harm that prompts
the action being taken. Here the Secretary has not addressed this af-
firmative burden.''
The court then condemned the beetle program as antithetical to wilder-
ness purposes and policies: "Only a clear necessity for upsetting the
equilibrium of the ecology could justify this highly injurious, semiex-
perimental venture of limited effectiveness."'"2 The court remanded for
the Forest Service to complete an environmental impact statement and
rethink the notion.'
The Forest Service did so, and came up with a much more limited
beetle control plan.' It narrowed the program's purposes, limited timber
cutting, made control the exception, and required adjacent private owners
to take their own reasonable steps.'" This time the court determined that
the Secretary met his burden "affirmatively to justify control actions
taken for the benefit of adjacent landowners" on the ground that wilder-
ness value would not be "unnecessarily sacrificed to promote the inter-
ests of adjacent landowners."' 6
The need for interpreting the scope of the affirmative duty was pre-
sented clearly in Sierra Club v. Yeutter.'" In that case, the plaintiffs al-
leged that the government breached the affirmative statutory duty, as
well as its obligations emanating from the public trust doctrine, by failing
to assert federal reserved water rights for national forests in Colorado in
pending state water rights adjudications." The Tenth Circuit avoided
addressing the merits by holding that the case was not ripe for adjudica-
tion.'7 In doing so, it remarked that the Wilderness Act "imposes an af-
firmative duty" to preserve wilderness character,"8 albeit a "limited"
171. Id. at42-43.
172. Id. at 43.
173. See id.
174. Cf Sierra Club v. Lyng, 663 F. Supp. 556, 557 (D.D.C. 1987) (discussing the plan adopted
by the Forest Service).
175. Sierra Club, 663 F. Supp. at 558.
176. Id. at 560.
177. 911 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1990).
178. See Yeutter, 911 F.2d at 1408.
179. See id. at 1421.
180. Id. at 1413; see also Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. Rogers, 141 F.3d 803, 810 (8th Cir.
1998) ("The Wilderness Act of 1964 makes agencies that administer wilderness areas responsible for
preserving their wilderness character."); California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465, 475 n. 12 (E.D.
Cal. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Areas




one."' It added that, even if the Wilderness Act creates federal reserved
water rights, "the Forest Service is not obligated to assert those rights in
the absence of a threat to the wilderness characteristics" of the affected
areas82 and that "only agency conduct that is irreconcilable with the
statutory mandate to preserve the wilderness characteristics of the Colo-
rado wilderness areas will invoke judicial review."'' In Vigil v.
Rhoades,' the court subsequently commented that it had held in Yeutter
that the statutory mandate at issue did not provide a "manageable standard
of review."'" The issue has arisen rarely enough that Yeutter's inconclu-
sive pronouncements concerning the content of the duty and the posture a
court will take in reviewing allegations of breach are about as expansive as
anything the courts have produced in interpreting section 4(b).
The issue of the extent of the land management agencies' duties to
take affirmative steps to protect resources committed to their stewardship
has arisen in other contexts." These analogous situations, however, point
in different directions. A California district court in the 1970s recognized
an affirmative duty in the nature of a trust obligation on the part of the
National Park Service to control logging practices on private land adja-
cent to Redwood National Park.'8 ' The duty arose from both the specific
legislation establishing the Park, which authorized the Interior Secretary
to take a variety of actions "to afford as full protection as is reasonably
possible" to park resources," and the National Park System Act, the
stated purpose of which is "to conserve the scenery and the natural and
historic objects and the wildlife therein."'' But the same court later dis-
missed the litigation, finding that the agency had done all that it reasona-
bly could have done.'"' No other courts have endorsed the public trust
181. Yeutter, 911 F.2d at 1413. The district court, in a previous phase of the case, had recog-
nized the administering agencies' duty under section 4(b) "to protect and preserve all wilderness
resources, including water," and "a general duty under the Wilderness Act to protect and preserve
wilderness water resources," but concluded that "[t]here is ... no specific statutory duty to claim
reserved water rights in the wilderness areas even though Congress impliedly reserved such rights in
order to effectuate the purposes of the Act." Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842, 864 (D. Colo.
1985) (emphasis added). For further discussion of the Sierra Club litigation, see Karin P. Sheldon,
Waterfor Wilderness, 76 DENY. U. L. REV. 555, 568-74 (1999).
182. Yeutter, 911 F.2dat 1418.
183. ld. at 1419.
184. 953 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993).
185. Vigil, 953 F.2d at 1231 n.7; see also Yeutter, 911 F.2d at 1414 (holding that the Wilder-
ness Act does not provide courts with meaningful or substantive standards to review agency land
management practices unless the practices are irreconcilable with the statutory mandate imposed by
the Wilderness Act).
186. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior (Sierra Club I1), 424 F. Supp. 172,
172-73 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior (Sierra Club II), 398 F. Supp.
284, 285 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior (Sierra Club I), 376 F. Supp.
90, 92 (N.D. Cal. 1974); see also cases cited in 1 CoGGiNs & GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 8.07 n.18.
187. Sierra Club , 376 F. Supp. at 95-96.
188. Id. at 94 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 79c(e)).
189. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); see Sierra Club II, 398 F. Supp. at 287.
190. See Sierra Club 111, 424 F. Supp. at 175-76.
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rationale of the Sierra Club cases, and other courts have rejected the no-
tion of extrastatutory trust responsibilities for the Park Service.'9' The
Park Service's compliance with any affirmative duties it has to protect
park resources appears to be at best, therefore, reviewable in only the
most deferential and perfunctory fashion."
The other obvious point of comparison comes from section 7(a)(1)
of the Endangered Species Act, which states that all federal agencies
"shall ... utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of [the
statute] by carrying out programs for the conservation" of listed endan-
gered and threatened species." In cases in which the issue has arisen, the
courts have acknowledged the existence of an affirmative conservation
duty.' That ESA duty extends beyond the obligation created by section
7(a)(2) to refrain from taking actions likely to jeopardize listed species or
result in the destruction or adverse modification of their critical habitat.'"
The affirmative conservation duty of section 7(a)(1) has provided courts
with grounds for invalidating bird hunting regulations issued by the Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS),' banning the use of lead shot in portions of
the national wildlife refuges to protect bald eagles," upholding a FWS
decision to close a wildlife refuge to human use to protect breeding
habitat for threatened birds,'" and enunciating an obligation on the part of
the Interior Secretary to deny water use permits that would impair suit-
able habitat for endangered fish.'" In one case, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the absolute terms in which the affirmative conservation duty
is phrased precludes the agency (in that case, the U.S. Navy) from re-
fusing to abide by it on the ground that doing so would be inconsistent
with its primary mission.' The duty overrides an agency's primary mis-
sion, although the agency retains discretion in choosing the means of
compliance."' The ESA's affirmative duty to conserve listed species is
191. See cases cited in 1 CoGINs & GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 8.07 n.18.
192. Id.
193. Endangered Species Act § 7(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (1994).
194. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. United States Dep't of the Navy, 898 F.2d 1410,1416-17
(9th Cir. 1990); Carson-Truckee Water Conservation Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257,259 (9th Cir. 1984).
195. See Endangered Species Act § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); see also House v. United
States Forest Serv., 974 F. Supp. 1022, 1028 (E.D. Ky. 1997) (enjoining timber sale for noncompli-
ance with affirmative duty to place listed species "at the top of [the agency's] priority list").
196. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167, 170 (D.D.C. 1977).
197. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 15 Envt'l L. Rep. 20891, 20893 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
198. See New England Naturist Ass'n v. Larsen, 692 F. Supp. 75, 76 (D.R.I. 1988).
199. See Carson-Truckee Water Conservation Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 262 (9th Cir. 1984).
200. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. United States Dep't of the Navy, 898 F. 2d 1410, 1417
(9th Cir. 1990).
201. See id. at 1418-19; see also Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 688 F. Supp. 1334, 1352 (D.
Minn. 1988), aff'd in relevant part, 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989) (deferring to agency judgment "as
to the proper level of activism"). Litigants have failed to demonstrate a violation of the duty in some
instances. See Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1511-12 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that section 7
does not apply to agreements formed prior to passage of the ESA); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Na-
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more stringent and therefore more judicially enforceable than the Park
Service's affirmative conservation obligations.
Which of the two models provides the more appropriate comparison
for interpretation of the affirmative duty of agencies with jurisdiction
over wilderness areas to preserve their wilderness character? We suggest
that the ESA's conservation duty is more analogous to the duty stem-
ming from section 4(b) of the Wilderness Act for at least two reasons.
First, the statutory language of section 4(b) is closer to that of section
7(a)(1) of the ESA than it is to the relevant Park Service Organic Act
provision.' The Organic Act requires that the Park Service "promote and
regulate the use" of the national parks and monuments "by such means
and measures as conform to the fundamental purposes" of those areas,
including conservation of scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild-
life. ' Although the word "promote" arguably signifies an obligation that
extends beyond merely stopping conduct that threatens park resources,
the Organic Act language is perhaps not as clear in its action-forcing
mandate as ESA section 7(a)(1)'s absolutely stated ' decree that agencies
"carry[] out programs for the conservation of endangered species and
threatened species."' The Wilderness Act's mandate-that agencies
administer wilderness areas to preserve such areas' character-implies a
stronger responsibility to initiate action with preservation aims than does
the Organic Act's delegation of authority to "regulate the use" of park
and monument resources.'
Second, putting aside such technical distinctions in statutory termi-
nology, courts interpreting the scope of section 4(b) need not be con-
cerned, as some courts which have refused to recognize a public trust
obligation for the Park Service appear to have been, with the separation
of powers issues attendant upon the creation of extrastatutory duties.'
Congress, by enacting section 4(b) of the Wilderness Act, created the
affirmative preservation duty and it is the responsibility of the courts to
see to its enforcement, provided that in the course of doing so they do not
usurp the discretion vested in the agencies by Congress.'
C. Protection Against External Threats
Even if the agencies with jurisdiction over official wilderness areas
have an affirmative obligation to take action to preserve wilderness char-
tional Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384, 392 (D. Wyo. 1987) (upholding NPS's refusal to close a camp-
ground to protect grizzly bears).
202. Compare Wilderness Act § 4(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (1994), and Endangered Species Act
§ 7(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (1994), with 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
203. 16 U.S.C. § 1.
204. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, 898 F.2d at 1417.
205. See Endangered Species Act § 7(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1).
206. 16 U.S.C. § 1.
207. Cf cases cited in I COGGJNS & GLUCKSMAN, supra note 6, § 8.07 n. 18.
208. See Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1419 (10th Cir. 1990).
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acter, their authority does not necessarily extend to activities on adjacent
private lands with the potential to impair that character. The litigated
instances in which agencies invoked that authority to protect wilderness
areas from external threats are again few in number, perhaps because of
the federal government's reluctance to assume jurisdiction.' In this
context, the text of the Wilderness Act is relatively unilluminating. The
provision establishing a National Wilderness Preservation System com-
posed of wilderness areas to be administered in a manner that leaves
them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness speaks only
to the administration of official wilderness areas themselves.' Section
4(b)'s mandate to "preserve" wilderness character arguably sweeps more
broadly, encompassing the authority to address threats to that character,
regardless of their location. "'
Particular wilderness areas are governed, of course, not only by the
1964 Act but also by the specific statutes adding those areas to the realm
of official wilderness. Some of these specific acts address the external
threats issue more directly. The Arkansas Wilderness Act of 1984,"2 for
example, disclaims any intention to create buffer zones around desig-
nated wilderness areas."3 In Newton County Wildlife Association v.
Rogers,"' the Eighth Circuit relied on this language to refuse to enjoin
timber sales outside wilderness areas based on resulting degradation of
downstream water quality of waters flowing through such areas."' The
Michigan Wilderness Ace'6 has a similar provision, which adds that
"[t]he fact that nonwilderness activities or uses can be seen or heard from
areas within the wilderness shall not, of itself, preclude such activities or
uses up to the boundary of the wilderness." '7
Courts have been unable to reach agreement on the scope of agency
authority to regulate activities outside wilderness areas that predated
designation. A recent set of disputes concerning the Forest Service's
efforts to restrict the use of sailboats and motorboats in a lake partially
located within a wilderness area is illustrative. In its decision in Stupak-
209. Cf. 2 COrGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 14.03 (addressing external threats to the
national parks).
210. Cf Wilderness Act § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1994).
211. Cf Wilderness Act § 4(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b).
212. Pub. L. No. 98-508, 98 Stat. 2349 (codified as amended, in pertinent part, at 16 U.S.C. §
1132 note (1994)).
213. See id. § 7, 98 Stat. at 2352 ("Congress does not intend that designation of wilderness
areas in the State of Arkansas lead to the creation of protective perimeters or buffer zones around
each wilderness area.").
214. 141 F.3d 803, 810 (8th Cir. 1998).
215. See Newton County Wildlife, 141 F.3d at 810.
216. Michigan Wilderness Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-184, 101 Stat. 1274 (codified as
amended, in pertinent part, at 16 U.S.C. § 1132 note (1994)).
217. Id. § 7, 101 Stat. at 1277.
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Thrall v. United States,"' the Sixth Circuit upheld the Forest Service's
authority to restrict certain uses of the lake, including sailboating, by
littoral owners because littoral rights were subject to reasonable regula-
tion under the police power, and the Property Clause"9 vested analogous
authority in federal agencies.' The same littoral owners, however, sub-
sequently convinced a district court that they were exempt from another
Forest Service regulation prohibiting motorboats in the lake because the
regulation failed to protect "valid existing rights" recognized by the
Michigan Wilderness Act."'
The external threats issue, like the affirmative preservation duty
issue, has provoked federal lands controversies outside the wilderness
context. The resulting decisions leave little doubt as to the federal gov-
ernment's constitutional authority under the Property Clause to regulate
conduct on private land that threatens to impair the purposes for which
federal lands have been withdrawn.' The more difficult question is
whether the concerned agencies have the appropriate statutory authority
to abate such threats. Courts have upheld the government's attempts to
prevent the spraying of pesticides within the boundaries of a national
river on both private and federal landse' and endorsed a plan to control
sources of air pollution adversely affecting visibility miles away in the
Grand Canyon. ' The Sierra Club also succeeded, as indicated above, in
convincing a federal district court, at least temporarily, that the Park
Service had not only the power but the duty to prevent logging adjacent
to Redwoods National Park.' Other attempts to abate external threats
have been less successful.'
218. Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996), aff'g on rehearing en banc
by an equally divided court 843 F. Supp. 327 (W.D. Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 764
(1997).
219. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States .... ).
220. See Stupak-Thrall, 843 F. Supp. at 330-32, aff'd, 89 F.3d at 1269. The Sixth Circuit itself
evidences the lack of agreement concerning the regulation of activity outside wilderness areas. In
Stupak-Thrall, fourteen judges sitting en banc were unable to reach a consensus, splitting seven to
seven, over the scope of the Wilderness Act's phrase, "subject to existing private rights." See Stu-
pak-Thrall, 89 F.3d at 1269 (construing Wilderness Act § 4(c), 16 U.S.C. 1133(c) (1994) and Michi-
gan Wilderness Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-184, § 5, 101 Stat. 12774, 1275 ("subject to existing
rights")); id. at 1269-72 (Moore, J., concurring); id. at 1272-1306 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
221. Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 988 F. Supp. 1055, 1064 (W.D. Mich. 1997).
222. See 2 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 6, § 14.03 (discussing the powers of the Na-
tional Park Service).
223. See United States v. Moore, 640 F. Supp. 164, 166-68 (S.D. W.Va. 1986).
224. See Central Ariz. Water Conservation Dist. v. EPA, 990 F.2d 1531, 1533 (9th Cir. 1993).
225. See Sierra Club I1, 424 F. Supp. 172, 172-73 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sierra Club 1, 398 F.
Supp. 284, 285 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Sierra Club 1, 376 F. Supp. 90,92 (N.D. Cal. 1974); see also supra
notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 485 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1973) (refusing to
compel action by the Bureau of Reclamation to prevent water impounded in Lake Powell from
spreading into a national monument); United States v. Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va.
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Congress could clear up the judicial confusion by enunciating that
agencies with jurisdiction over official wilderness are authorized to
regulate activity on adjacent state or private land whose development or
use may threaten wilderness character. The trend in recent individual
wilderness designation legislation has been to the contrary, probably in
part due to fears that such regulation may trigger an obligation to com-
pensate and in part due to a desire to avoid the anticipated political fire-
storm likely to result from authorization to address external threats. But
the politically expedient path often diverges from the one most likely to
protect the long-term public good. The Wilderness Act, after all, was
adopted largely to protect the interests of future generations, so the long
view is a particularly appropriate consideration here.
Moreover, the rationale, both politically and legally, for regulation
of external threats to wilderness areas is not difficult to discern. The
splintered court in Stupak-Thrall affirmed a district court's opinion up-
holding Forest Service regulation of boating by littoral owners on the
theory that those owners were already subject to the reasonable exercise
of state police power-the federal government's Property Clause powers
applied by analogy.' 7 Likewise, the state police power encompasses
regulation of nuisance-like uses of property' and activities on private
lands that threaten the character of official wilderness are not unfairly
described as nuisances.9
CONCLUSION
Neither law nor history' is static. American citizens who recognize
the benefits of untrammeled lands owe a great debt of gratitude to those
who in 1964 made official wilderness a reality. Without their efforts,
qualifying lands would have almost certainly diminished greatly over the
succeeding decades, depriving future generations of the opportunities for
wilderness experiences.
But, from the preservationist perspective, what has been achieved is
not (and probably never will be) enough. The 1964 Act provides a foun-
dation for wilderness preservation efforts. The potential to build upon
1979) (refusing to prevent the construction of office buildings which would potentially diminish
views from national monuments in Washington, D.C.).
227. See Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269, 1269 (6th Cir. 1996), affg on rehearing
en banc by an equally divided court 843 F. Supp. 327, 330-32 (W.D. Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 764 (1997).
228. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389-90 (1926).
229. Cf. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897) (erecting fence entirely on private
land, and thereby disrupting use of public land, is a nuisance).
230. History involves the interpretation of events that occurred in the past. Because such inter-
pretation is inevitably filtered through the lens of the present, past "events" are often transformed
over time. Cf. Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IowA L. REv. 277, 307 ("[AIIl history
involves a fusion of horizons in which historical materials are interrogated to ask contemporary
questions about contemporary life.").
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that foundation inheres in the addition of nonrepresented ecosystems,
recreated wilderness areas, private lands, and offshore lands to the realm
of official wilderness. The foundation itself may be somewhat insecure,
however. Absent resolution of a series of wilderness management issues
in a manner that insures protection of areas already designated as official
wilderness, that foundation may be chipped away by incremental incur-
sions by human development into areas previously "untrammeled" by
humans."'
231. Wildemess Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994).
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